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Abstract 
The European Spallation Source faces a great challenge 
in succeeding with its ambitious availability goals. The 
aim is to construct a machine that allows for 95% 
availability for neutron beam production. This goal 
requires a robust protection system that allows for high 
availability by continuously monitoring and acting on the 
machine states, in order to avoid long facility downtimes 
and optimize the operation at any stage. The normal 
conducting section consists of the first 48 meters of the 
machine, and performs the initial acceleration, bunching, 
steering, and focusing of the beam, which sets it up for 
optimal transition into the superconducting section. 
Through a fit-for-purpose risk management process, a set 
of protection functions has been identified. The risk 
identification, analysis, and treatment were done in 
compliance with modern safety and ISO standards. This 
ensures that the risks, in this case downtime and 
equipment damage, are properly prevented and mitigated. 
This paper describes this process of defining the 
protection functions for the normal conducting linac at 
ESS. 
INTRODUCTION 
The high neutron production availability goals of ESS 
require the linear proton accelerator (linac) to produce, 
bunch, accelerate, steer, and focus the proton beam with 
high quality and reliability. The first 48 meters consist of 
normal conducting (NC) structures, and this is the most 
critical part of the accelerator as the options for retuning 
or adjustments are minimal. It is critical that the proton 
beam envelope as well as its beam energy are exact at the 
exit of the last NC structure to allow for further 
acceleration and transport, through the superconducting 
(SC) parts, to the tungsten target wheel. An overview 
schematic of the ESS linac is seen in Figure 1. 
The NC linac, constituting the five leftmost blocks in 
Figure 1, consists of a 75 keV ion source, low energy 
beam transport (LEBT) structure, radio-frequency 
quadrupole (RFQ), medium energy beam transport 
(MEBT), and five drift tube linac (DTL) tanks. After 
leaving the last DTL tank, the beam energy is 90 MeV. 
The proton beam will, at nominal operation and upon 
exiting the MEBT, have a 2.86 millisecond pulse length 
with 14 Hz repetition rate [1]. 
AVAILABILITY-DRIVEN  
MACHINE PROTECTION 
Machine protection (MP) at ESS has been identified as 
an important driver for successfully reaching the 
availability goals of the facility [2]. The MP strategy is to 
identify and analyze systems and devices that play a role 
in this goal and, based on the outcome, adapt their 
functional behavior accordingly. MP is thus classified as a 
system of systems (SoS) [3], recognizing the complexity 
of and interactions between several systems that all need 
to fulfill their role for the overall MP-SoS to succeed. 
In order to identify key functions of the MP-SoS, an 
ESS MP risk management process lifecycle has been 
developed that identifies and analyzes so-called damage 
events throughout the machine [4]. A damage event is an 
event that has a facility downtime (loss of neutron 
production) and a cost associated to it, whose 
combination creates a severity category. Based on that 
severity, the appropriate MP measures are taken. These 
damage events are then associated with a set of hazards 
that are to be prevented or mitigated by overall protection 
functions (OPF). The risk management process follows 
the IEC 61508 standard for functional safety [5], as well 
as the ISO 31000 risk management standard [6]. 
As the NC linac is found to be critical for the quality 
and availability of the proton beam, and in extension 
neutron production at ESS, this part of the machine has 
been analyzed by the ESS MP team together with the 
respective system experts to identify damage events, 
hazards, OPFs, and technology-specific protection 
functions (PF) where applicable. These PFs are then to be 
implemented into the MP-SoS by making use of the 
constituent systems as described below. 
MP-RELATED NC LINAC SYSTEMS  
AND DAMAGE EVENTS 
The MP-related systems in the NC linac are identified 
as the linac magnets, interceptive devices, vacuum 
system, and buncher cavities. In addition, the beam 
monitoring system is included in several PFs as it is able 
to monitor the necessary beam parameters, but it does not 
have any damage events associated to it. These systems 
are briefly described below. 
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Figure 1: The ESS linac with its different sections, including lengths and nominal beam energies. Source: 
esss.se/accelerator. 
Linac Magnets 
The linac magnets consist of quadrupole magnets for 
focusing and dipole magnets for steering the beam. These 
are placed together, where the dipoles are located inside 
the quadrupoles. The quadrupoles are located in FODO 
lattices for alternated focusing in the two transversal 
directions. In the NC linac, there are 11 magnet pairs, all 
located in the MEBT. The damage events associated with 
these magnets are overheating in case of insufficient 
water cooling or overcurrent from the power supplies, as 
well as degradation or damage from particle losses in the 
equipment. 
Interceptive Devices 
The category of interceptive devices (ID) includes 
everything that intercepts (goes into) the proton beam. At 
ESS, these are beam stops (BS), wire scanners (WS), 
emittance measurement units (EMU), beam scrapers 
(movable collimators), and an iris collimator. There is one 
BS in the LEBT, one in the MEBT, and two in the DTL. 
WS are located in three locations in the MEBT, and there 
is one EMU in the LEBT and one in the MEBT. The iris 
is located at the very beginning of the LEBT to adjust the 
beam current. All of these are designed to be able to take 
at least 50 µs of beam at 1 Hz pulse repetition rate, but the 
LEBT BS is able to take the full beam. The BSs, EMUs, 
scrapers, and iris are water cooled, and can thus break 
from lack of cooling, identified as a damage event. All of 
the IDs (except for the LEBT BS) have a damage event 
where they receive too much beam. As a last damage 
event, the scrapers and WSs can break mechanically by 
being crushed against each other in the beam pipe. 
Vacuum System 
The main role of the vacuum system is to keep high 
quality vacuum conditions in the beam pipe and other 
areas, such as vacuum shielding. In order to prevent 
extensive vacuum pollution and equipment damage in 
case of vacuum losses, or during maintenance periods, 
there is a set of vacuum gate valves that separate 
beamline sections from each other when needed. One is 
located before the LEBT and one after, one before the 
MEBT and one after, as well as one after DTL tanks 2, 3, 
4, and 5. These valves, when located upstream of the 
beam destination, cannot be closed when beam is 
operating and the damage event of beam hitting a gate 
valve is included in the MP analysis. Additionally, a 
mechanical damage event of the valves is identified and 
analyzed. 
Buncher Cavities 
There are three buncher cavities at ESS, located in the 
MEBT. Their role is, as the name suggests, to bunch the 
proton beam in order to match the downstream radio 
frequency structures, such as drift tubes and 
superconducting cavities. The buncher cavities are water 
cooled and have the damage event of overheating due to 
lack of cooling. From beam physics simulations [7], it is 
also found that buncher cavity 2 and 3 can be hit by the 
proton beam and deform. 
PROTECTION FUNCTION DEFINITION 
The definition of PFs follow a process defined in [4], 
where the damage events are analyzed for the hazards that 
may lead to damage. Each hazard is then assigned one 
OPF, which is a generic function to prevent or mitigate 
the specific hazard. Depending on the severity level of the 
hazard, the OPF needs to fulfill a certain level of 
robustness. Up until the OPFs, no technology-specific 
systems have been identified to treat the hazards. This is 
instead done in the next PF step, in collaboration between 
the MP analysis team, integration team, and the system 
owners (e.g. the vacuum engineers in the case of the 
vacuum system) in order to define appropriate and 
implementable functions. The hierarchical analysis flow 
is seen in Figure 2, starting at the system level.  
All of the PFs that are associated with stopping the 
proton beam to prevent damage will include the ESS 
beam interlock system (BIS) and a set of beam-stop 
actuators. The actuation consists in (a) inhibiting the 
timing system from generating a beam pulse, (b) 
activating the LEBT chopper and (c) MEBT chopper 
Figure 2: The MP analysis flow, from system, through
damage device, damage event, hazards, overall protection
functions (OPF), and protection functions (PF). 
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continuously, and (d) interlocking the ion source 
magnetron. In the case of an emergency beam interlock, 
also the (e) power for the plasma generation and (f) 
proton extraction mechanisms of the ion source are cut 
[8]. The protection for all systems described in this paper, 
except for the buncher cavities, is coordinated by 
dedicated local protection systems (LPS), controlled by a 
safety PLC.  
Each PF contains a sensor, logic element, actuator, 
timing requirement, and protection integrity level (PIL) 
[4,5]. The logic element for all functions is the LPS PLC 
(except buncher cavities and beam current monitoring) 
and BIS, and the actuators are as stated above. In the 
subsections below, the PFs for each system are mentioned 
and tabulated with their sensor, timing requirement and 
PIL. 
Linac Magnets 
The damage events from the linac magnets are handled 
by PFs that stop beam if the measured beam losses around 
the equipment are too high and that monitor the magnet 
temperature, supplied current, and cooling water flow to 
stop beam and power supply when necessary. 
Table 1: Protection function sensor, timing, and PIL for 
the linac magnets. 
Sensors Timing PIL 
Differential Beam Current Monitors 30 µs 1 
Neutron Beam Loss Monitors - 0 
Thermo-switches 100 ms 1 
Current monitors 100 ms 0 
Cooling water flow meters 1 s 0 
Interceptive Devices 
The hazard and risk analysis identifies that inserting a 
beam of too high current, repetition rate, or too long pulse 
length while an ID is in has to be prevented, just as 
inserting an ID if incompatible beam is already running. 
This can be handled through ID position switches and 
beam mode consistency checks by the BCMs during 
beam operation. The water-cooled IDs have the cooling 
monitored, and the EMUs and iris are also required to 
have temperature sensors. The scrapers monitor the 
charge deposition through a dedicated monitor. Finally, 
beam position monitors (BPM) check whether the beam is 
in the correct path. 
Table 2: Protection function sensor, timing, and PIL for 
the interceptive devices. 
Sensors Timing PIL 
Position switch (out) 100 ms 2 
Position switch (in) 100 ms 1 
Proton Beam Mode Consistency 100 ms 1 
Cooling water flow meters 1 s 0 
Cooling water temperature meters 1 s 1 
EMU temperature sensor 1 s 0 
Iris temperature sensor 1 s 0 
Scraper charge deposition monitor 30 µs 1 
BPM 30 µs 0 
Vacuum System 
The vacuum valves cannot be in the pipe while beam is 
running, and thus have to be extracted before starting 
beam operation. Just as beam has to be stopped if they are 
inserted. This is handled by position switches on the 
valves and through monitoring the dedicated (vacuum 
interlock) signal that closes the valves.  
Table 3: Protection function sensor, timing, and PIL for 
the vacuum system. 
Sensors Timing PIL 
Position switch (out) 100 ms 2 
Position switch (in) 100 ms 1 
Vacuum interlock signal 1 s 0 
Fast valve controller 3 ms 1 
Buncher Cavities 
Protection of the buncher cavities is done through 
measuring the surrounding beam losses in the same way 
as for the linac magnets, monitoring the beam position 
fluctuations through BPMs, and monitoring the cooling 
water flow and temperature and stopping beam if these 
are wrong. 
Table 4: Protection function sensor, timing, and PIL for 
the buncher cavities. 
Sensors Timing PIL 
Differential Beam Current Monitors 30 µs 1 
Cooling water flow meters 1 s 0 
Cooling water temperature meters 1 s 1 
BPM 30 µs 1 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The tough availability requirements on ESS has made 
machine protection an important tool for the success of 
the facility. By avoiding long downtimes and costly 
repairs, the facility can operate at a high power during 
extended periods of time. The machine protection risk 
management process that has been developed at ESS is 
found suitable for the analysis of damage events 
throughout the facility and ties those to custom protection 
functions. This paper has presented the protection 
functions associated to the normal conducting linac and 
briefly described the process behind their derivation. As 
the design of the facility is ongoing, the analysis and 
implementation of protection functions need to be flexible 
yet robust, and more iterations are foreseen before the 
complete set can be finalized. 
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